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Abstract
This essay shows why the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada
violates precedent, the Constitution, and the very basis
for the relationship between government and the
governed. First, the Court has violated the clear limits
Terry v. Ohio set on the restricted searches based on
reasonable suspicion within the restrictions of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. By using the power of
the state to compel citizens to produce identification, it
also violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
as well as the unenumerated rights that conceptually
link the enumerated rights in the Court’s
jurisprudence. Finally, this country was founded on
the belief that government has to justify itself to the
citizens, and the Hiibel decision inverts this
relationship. To rectify these transgressions, we argue
that the Court should return to the bright-line rule
articulated in Terry: The officer may ask; the suspect
may remain silent.
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“Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign,
if the police can pick him up whenever they do not
like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’
him in their discretion, we enter a new regime”
(Terry v. Ohio, 1968)1

I. Introduction
Can the state, on the basis of reasonable suspicion—a standard
lower than probable cause2—arrest citizens for not identifying
themselves? According to Hiibel v. Nevada County, the answer is
yes, if state statute authorizes it.3 Now the police can, with the power
of the law, compel citizens to identify themselves or face punishment.
With this decision, the Supreme Court has changed the relationship
between the citizens and the state, turning the justification for our
Constitution upside-down.
This paper argues that, while the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
issues are sufficient to show that Nevada’s stop and identify statute is
unconstitutional, the mutually reinforcing nature of the First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments provides a coherent and compelling basis for
overturning the law and for understanding the relationship between
the citizen and the state under our Constitution. To that end, the
Second section gives the facts of Hiibel and sketches the arguments to
follow. The Third section discusses the limitations on pre-Hiibel
police interrogatories under Terry and how the Hiibel decision ignores
1

392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (J. Douglas, dissent).
See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets 75 COR. L. REV. 1258, 1332-1333 (1999) (contending
that there is “no way to meaningfully articulate a standard between probable cause
and arbitrariness.”); See also Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable
Suspicion 60 OHSLJ 99, 99-102 (1999) (discussing the “incoherent and inconsistent
caselaw” for determining the influence of a neighborhood in determining whether or
not a suspects behavior can be characterized as “reasonably suspicious.”); See also
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983) ("The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not
'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'”);
3
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 S.Ct 2451
(2004).
2
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those standards. The Fourth section considers the limitations on
unconstitutionally vague statutes under Kolender4 and the failure of
Nevada’s stop and identify statute to meet those standards. The Fifth
section shows how the Court’s transgression of both Terry and
Kolender in Hiibel effectively gives the police license to make a Terry
stop an identification checkpoint.
By legitimizing identity
checkpoints, as the paper develops those violations in the Sixth
section, the Hiibel decision runs afoul of First Amendment
protections manifesting themselves in unenumerated rights the Court
has already recognized.
Furthermore, we consider the philosophical underpinnings of the
Constitution as manifested in the Court’s previous rulings on
unenumerated rights to support finding Nevada’s stop and identify
statue unconstitutional because it reverses the relationship between
state and citizen the Court’s jurisprudence hitherto sought to retain.
In the Conclusion we contend that restoring the bright-line rule from
Terry will return the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment protections
that Nevada’s stop and identify statute violates: The police may
question, but the suspect may remain silent. Any rule giving police
the authority to arrest on the basis of silence without probable cause
reverses the relationship between citizens and the state by requiring
citizens to assist the police to their own possible detriment. As Hiibel
has reversed the relationship between citizens and the state, this
change requires the Court to reverse its course.

II. Background to Hiibel
This fundamental change in the relationship between citizens and
the state had its budding in rural Nevada. On May 21, 2000,
Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy Lee Dove responded to a report of
an alleged assault: that a man driving a truck was seen hitting a
woman passenger.5 Following the witness’s report, Dove found
Dudley Hiibel standing on the passenger side of the road beside a
GMC pick-up truck.6 As he walked up to Hiibel, Dove said that he
4

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455. See also http://papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2006) (offering a video of Hiibel’s arrest). In fact, the video
indicates that the daughter was driving (and the record suggests that she hit her
father.)
6
Id.
5
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had a report of a fight, and Hiibel said he did not know about a fight.7
Dove then asked Hiibel if he had “any identification on [him],” and
Hiibel said he did not.8 Hiibel was asked eleven times for
identification, and he refused each time.9 Between requests, Hiibel
asked Dove if he was being charged with anything, if he was illegally
parked, and suggested arresting him.10 Hiibel then said something
that cannot be discerned from the transcript, and Dove replied that “It
could be a searchable situation.” Eventually, Dove threatened to
arrest Hiibel if he did not produce any identification.11 Hiibel
unwaveringly refused to provide identification and was arrested.12
The State of Nevada charged Hiibel with delaying Dove in the
execution of his official duties, a misdemeanor.13 Hiibel was so
charged because he allegedly violated Nevada’s “stop and identify”
statute, which requires persons detained under reasonable suspicion to
identify themselves:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the
officer encounters under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the person has committed,
is committing or is about to commit a crime.
…..
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this
section only to ascertain his identity and the
suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence
abroad.
Any person so detained shall identify
himself, but may not be compelled to answer any
other inquiry of any peace officer.14
Hiibel challenged his arrest all the way to the United States
Supreme Court, eventually losing his constitutional challenge to
Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute. In its ruling, the Court decided
5 to 4 that arresting Hiibel for failing to identify himself while
detained under reasonable suspicion for assault does not violate the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments. Unfortunately, this ruling neither
comports with past Supreme Court precedents nor with the
fundamental justification for our democratic government.
7

Id.
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See supra note 5, Hiibel video.
12
124 S.Ct. at 2455.
13
Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 199.280 (2003).
14
Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 171.123 (2003).
8
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In recounting the arrest, the Court notes that Dove asked Hiibel
for some identification, “which we understand as a request to produce
a driver's license or some other form of written identification.”15
Later, the Court states that, following the Nevada Supreme Court, the
stop and identify “statute does not require a suspect to give the officer
a driver's license or any other document. Provided that the suspect
either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other
means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute
is satisfied and no violation occurs.”16 Discussing the reasons behind
Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself, the Court states that “[a]s best we
can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought
his name was none of the officer’s business,”17 suggesting that a
weighing of Hiibel’s reason’s against those of law enforcement is in
order.
There is, however, nothing about Terry that allows for such a
weighing exercise; instead, Terry simply gives police the right to ask
question that the suspect need not answer and conduct a limited
physical search for weapon if the officer has reason to think the
suspect is armed. Importantly, this physical search does not aid the
police in their investigation; rather, it is to preserve the officer’s
safety during the questioning Terry authorizes.18 Moreover, basic
constitutional considerations about the structure of our government do
not require that citizens justify themselves to police on the basis of
reasonable suspicion. Since the Court cannot tell what Deputy Dove
asked Hiibel to produce—his name or written identification—it
comes as no surprise that the Court made a decision that does not
comport with the dicta from the unanimous Berkemer Court19 as well
as concurrences from Terry and other opinions. 20 Ignoring the dicta
15

Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455.
Id. at 2457.
17
Id. at 2461.
18
Infra at 10-12.
19
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (An “officer may ask the
[Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try
to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the
detainee is not obliged to respond.").
20
Illinois v. Wardlow, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (stating that stopping a fleeing
suspect “is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.”); Kolander v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (stating that a Terry suspect “must be free to leave after a
short time and to decline to answer the questions put to him.”) (J. Brennan,
concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (J. White, concurring) (“However, given
the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may
be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of
16
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and concurrences from these earlier decisions has led the Court to
violate their longstanding interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
On the grounds of reasonable suspicion, arresting a suspect for
refusing a request for a name violates the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections established under Terry and Kolender.
According to White’s concurrence in Terry,21 reiterated by the Court
in Berkemer, “[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer
furnishes no basis for an arrest,”22 because of the Fifth Amendment’s
protections against self incrimination.23
Furthermore, under
Brennan’s concurrence in Kolender, a statute may not require a
suspect to provide “credible and reliable” identification, for in doing
so the statute would circumvent Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures; specifically, allowing an
arrest to occur on less than probable cause, the long held standard for
taking someone into custody.24 A requirement for “credible and
reliable” information in a stop and identify statute allows the police to
arrest a suspect who fails to meet a standard the Court hitherto held
only to apply to probable cause.25 While Nevada’s stop and identify
statute was interpreted by the Court to require a suspect only to
provide a name, if there is any question about the suspect’s name then
the statute becomes pretext for demanding more reliable
identification, creating the same violations as in Kolender.
For example, the police are unlikely to believe a suspect who
claims his name is ‘John Doe’. Under the cover of Nevada’s stop and
identify statute the police cannot use the threat of arrest to elicit proof
that the suspect’s name is correct without transgressing the
course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled,
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the
officer to the need for continued observation.”).
21
392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (J. White, concurring).
22
Id.
23
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (explaining that the non-threatening nature of the
Terry stops—no threat of arrest for not responding to the officer’s questions—is the
reasoning behind not worrying about Fifth Amendment protections).
24
See Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National
Identification Systems 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH 319, 383, note 360 (discussing Justice
William Brennan’s concurrence in Kolender).
25
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 367-68 (J. Brennan, concurring) (“[I]t goes without saying
that arrest and the threat of a criminal sanction have a substantial impact on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, far more severe than we have ever permitted
on less than probable cause.”).
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prohibitions from Kolender against the compelled production of
“credible and reliable” identification. To expect a citizen with a name
like ‘John Doe’ to assert his right under Kolender against the
compelled production of “credible and reliable” identification under
the threat of arrest is to substitute Panglossian optimism26 for policy:
The bright-line rule must be drawn on the side of restricting police
power.
But the clear violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence from Kolender and Terry is just part of the Court’s error
in Hiibel. Under the penumbra cast by the First Amendment, there
are rights citizens have that are necessary for exercising of the right
specified by that amendment. A forteriori, maintaining liberty
requires more than just the rights enumerated in the Constitution;
liberty and the enumerated rights also require privacy. Without
privacy, there are chilling effects on liberty because of the
repercussion for proponent of unpopular views. Likewise, without
privacy, the extension of Fourth Amendment protections to phone
tapping in Katz27 does not make sense. Privacy as a penumbral rights
is the factor that both justifies and protects liberty as well as
undergirding the enumerated rights in constitutional jurisprudence.
For example, the Due Process clause has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to allow the right for unmarried couples to use
contraception, a consequence of recognizing a right to privacy.28
Likewise, as we shall argue, the right to freedom of expression
requires that the government allow people to move about without
disclosing their identity unless the state has a compelling interest.
Unenumerated privacy is the right that underlies many of the rights
actually enumerated in the Constitution, for without privacy there is
no freedom of expression, liberty, or protection against unreasonable
search.
By excluding a name from those things covered by privacy, the
state enhances its power to require a person to justify herself to
government instead of it constituting an entity that proves its worth to
26

VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (John Butt, trans., Penguin Books 1947).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the government’s
electronic listening to the defendant’s conversation on a public telephone booth
violate the defendant’s privacy); overruling the physical intrusion test of Olmstead
v. United States and affirming the right to privacy. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (J. Brandeis,
dissenting) (“[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”).
28
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27
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citizens: This thereby undermines the very premise upon which our
country was founded as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution—to
“secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The
Bill of Rights affords persons in the United States certain protections
against the government.
Before Terry, the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment was the level of justification
necessary for the state to seize and search someone.
Now, the state does not need this justification. Under reasonable
suspicion, the state can now arrest someone for not providing a name.
Instead of being left alone until the state has the justification
necessary to interfere, citizens can now be questioned by police and
arrested for not volunteering information. Without probable cause,
the state can arrest citizens who do not provide what it desires. We
can no longer live free from unwanted government inference. Simply
not giving the state what it wants—something the state has not proved
it needs to the standards of the Fourth Amendment—can lead to an
arrest. To stay out of jail we must do what the state wants, reversing
the relationship between the government and the people as conceived
at the founding.

III. Pre-Hiibel Terry Stops
In Terry, the Supreme Court ruled that police need not have
probable cause to seize a person.29 Instead, Terry allowed police to
briefly detain a suspect on the basis of “reasonable suspicion.”30 The
concerns that motivated the Court to curtail requirements for probable
cause stemmed from the state’s interest in “effective crime prevention
and detection,” the interest that motivated the police officer in
Hiibel.31 By recognizing the need for “swift action predicated upon
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subject to the
warrant procedure,”32 the Court has allowed states to pass laws that
enable the police, with reasonable suspicion, to use “the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s
suspicion in a short period of time.”33
29

Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
Id.
31
Id. at 22.
32
Id. at 20.
33
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
30
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What constitutes “the least intrusive means reasonably available
to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time” is
defined by the situation. Actions officer can undertake on the basis of
reasonable suspicion are limited by the Fourth Amendment.34 In
Terry, the officer in question “took hold of [petitioner] and patted
down the outer surfaces of his clothing” to search for a weapon.35
The officer executing the frisk was concerned with more than “the
government interest in investigating the crime,” and the Court took
this into consideration by expressing worries about “the police officer
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could be unexpectedly and fatally
used against him.”36 To meet the officer’s interest in safety, the Court
held that when there is reasonable suspicion, “the proper balance that
has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there
must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer.”37
The Court defined reasonable suspicion as “whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.”38 Assuming this
antecedent condition is in place, the Court then explored the
“reasonable search” allowed by constitutional protections. The Court
acknowledged that, like the determination that there is reasonable
suspicion, a reasonable search is also dependent on “the concrete
factual circumstances of individual cases.”39 Such a search must “be
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably defined to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer.”40 For example, extending the Terry analysis to other
situations, the Court has concluded that if, during the cursory search,
the officer finds what feels like drugs, the officer cannot then compel
the suspect to produce the suspected drugs: “Nothing in Terry can be
understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or,
indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons.”41
34

Id. at 499-500.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
36
Id. at 23.
37
Id. at 27 (emphasis added.)
38
Id.
39
Id. at 29.
40
Id.
41
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979). See also Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979) (“Thus, Terry departed from traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis in two respects. First, it defined a special category of Fourth
Amendment ‘seizures’ so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general
35
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Thus a Terry stop allows for a brief weapons search that is
predicated on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot
and confined to cursory measures to ensure the officer’s safety.
Subsequent opinions affirmed these limitations: In Minnesota v.
Dickerson, the Court ruled that Terry frisks instigated for purposes
other than safety are illegitimate.42 Any evidence obtained outside the
scope of a search authorized by Terry is inadmissible unless that
evidence falls under the “plain-view” doctrine, meaning that if the
evidence is found through a frisk for weapons and, while not a
weapon, is unmistakable contraband, that evidence is admissible.43
So expanding the scope of the search in a Terry stop requires

rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable
could be replaced by a balancing test. Second, the application of this balancing test
led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less
rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for
weapons.”); U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1974) (“In Terry v. Ohio,
the Court declined expressly to decide whether facts not amounting to probable
cause could justify an ‘investigative seizure’ short of an arrest, but it approved a
limited search--a pat-down for weapons--for the protection of an officer
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and
dangerous. The Court approved such a search on facts that did not constitute
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime, requiring only that 'the
police officer . . . be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' a belief that
his safety or that of others is in danger.”) (citations omitted).
42
508 U.S. 366 (1993) (“Under the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the
record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police
officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for
weapons allowed under Terry. Where, as here, ‘an officer who is executing a valid
search for one item seizes a different item,’ this Court rightly ‘has been sensitive to
the danger ... that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a
warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and
seize at will.’ Here, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after
having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to ‘[t]he sole
justification of the search [under Terry] ... the protection of the police officer and
others nearby.’ It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent cases.”)
(citations omitted).
43
Id. (“We think that this doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases
in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an
otherwise lawful search. The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if
contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful
vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and
thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment--or at least no search
independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.”).
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disregarding the Court’s previous holding that a Terry stop is simply a
narrow search for weapons predicate upon the officer’s safety.44
Justice Harlan’s concurrence makes this point clear: “Concealed
weapons create an immediate and severe danger to the public, and
though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks,

44

While Tracey Maclin argues that the Terry rationale has been expanded to cover a
variety of searches beyond safety, each of the cases he enumerates rests on different
grounds: Minnesota v. Dickenson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that police may
seize contraband found in a Terry frisk that is distinguishable as contraband through
the Terry search alone because such evidence falls under plain-feel, a doctrine
analogous to the plain-view doctrine); Alabama v. White 496 U.S 325 (1990)
(holding that anonymous tip constituted reasonable suspicion for a stop that resulted
in a consensual search); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment allows for a protective sweep of a residence where an arrest
occurs when the officers have reasonable suspicion that there are others present in
the resident who could pose a threat to the officers’ safety); United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (fitting a “drug courier profile” constitutes reasonable
suspicion); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding that while an officer
removing papers obscuring a vehicle identification number was a search under the
Fourth Amendment, a weapon in plain view observed during the search could be
admitted as evidence); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (acknowledging
an open question as to whether all fingerprinting is prohibited, stating that there “is
thus support in our cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment would permit
seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the
suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and
if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.” The Court held that the fingerprinting
violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221 (1985) (allowing the seizure of evidence in plain-view seen after a
legitimate Terry stop); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the
school environment allows for searches on less than probable cause); Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that even if the suspect was seized under
Terry the search was consensual, so the evidence could be admitted); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (allowing a canine “sniff test” on the basis of
less reasonable suspicion because the sniff test is sui generis, only indicating the
presence of illegal drugs, and does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that
the search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during a Terry stop for
the officers’ safety is reasonable); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
(holding that officers executing a valid search warrant on a resident can seize the
person who lives in the residence while the search is conducted); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (ruling that the officer’s auto stop and Terry frisk were
reasonable). See Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than
the Disease 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1994) (“Predictably, [the Terry] narrow
exception has been stretched and distorted so that government intrusions are now
permitted in a variety of contexts that have nothing to do with the safety of patrol
officers or the circumstances at issue in Terry.”) (citation omitted).
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it could well warrant action on less than a ‘probability’.”45 Harlan’s
line of thought contends that “[o]nce that first encounter was justified,
however, the officer’s right to take suitable measures for his own
safety followed automatically.”46 The majority holding affirms these
limits:
We merely hold that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the person he is dealing
with may be armed and presently dangerous… …he is
entitled for protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.47
The point that the search authorized by Terry is limited to
weapons for the officer’s safety is further established by considering
what was at issue between the justices in the decision itself. In his
dissent, Justice Douglas argues against allowing any kind of detention
under reasonable suspicion, contending that
it is a mystery how that "search" and that "seizure" can
be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards,
unless there was "probable cause" to believe that (1) a
crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the
process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to
be committed.48
Considering the majority opinion against the dissent makes apparent
that the Court’s major concern was how to allow the police officer’s
physical search in Terry while upholding the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court did this by predicating the search on the
officer’s safety and limiting the search to weapons that might threaten
the officer’s safety. The searches Terry allows are justified by police
safety during the encounter and limited to weapons that threaten
safety; any extension of the scope of allowable searches goes beyond
what Terry allows. Furthermore, there never was any contemplation
that the suspect could be compelled to answer any question the officer
asks during the encounter.

45

Terry, 392 U. S. at 31-31. (J. Harlan, concurring).
Id. at 34. (J. Harlan, concurring).
47
Terry, 392 U.S. 30 (emphasis added).
48
Id. at 35 (dissent, J. Douglas).
46
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In comparing Terry to Hiibel, the first elision in the Court’s
opinion is the complete disconnect between the types of searches
allowed by each case. The Hiibel Court acknowledges that Justice
White, concurring in Terry, stated that “a person detained in an
investigative stop can be questioned but is ‘not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest’.”49 In Hiibel, the petitioner is arrested for not
giving his name. However, the Court maintained that Terry did not
foreclose the question of whether a person detained under reasonable
suspicion may be compelled by arrest to supply a name.50
First, the Court rejects the view of Justice White, contending that
the threat of arrest is necessary to prevent the request for a name from
“becom[ing] a legal nullity.”51 The Court’s concern to avoid a legal
nullity oversteps their prior affirmation of Justice White in the
unanimous Berkemer Court,52 Royer,53 and Davis54 held to comprise
the constitutional limits on police questioning under reasonable
suspicion—that the police can ask for a name but the suspect need not
answer.55 To support its rationale that the request for identity not
become a legal nullity, the Court gives some general policy reasons
divorced from the safety concerns in Terry: “identity may inform an
officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of
violence or mental disorder.”56 In Hiibel, the Court concludes that
“[t]he officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry”57 and “was
‘reasonably related in scope to the concern which justified’ the
stop.”58 However, the scope and concern is not what justifies
searches in Terry. Instead, Terry searches are limited to the officer’s
safety.

49

Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (Justice White,
concurring).
50
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S 47, 53, n. 3 (“We
need not decide whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify
himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth
Amendment requirements.”).
51
Id. at 2459.
52
Supra note 20.
53
Royer 460 U.S. at 497-8 (affirming Justice White’s contention in Terry that a
suspect need not answer questions)
54
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 729 n. 6 (1969) (noting the “settled principle”
that police officers may not compel answers to questions about unsolved crimes).
55
See supra 5-6
56
Id. at 2458.
57
Id. at 2460.
58
Id. (quoting Terry at 20).
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The Court maintains that “[t]he principles of Terry permit a State
to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry
stop.”59 In making this assertion, the Court ignores the security
rationale in Terry; instead, the Court contends that the reasonableness
of requiring a name passes the balancing test articulated in Delaware
v. Prouse60 because the “request for identity has an immediate relation
to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.”61
However, as explained above, the purpose and rationale of the search
permitted by a Terry stop is to ensure safety. And the practical
demands of the Terry decision were to ensure that the methods of the
search do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
As our analysis of the Terry majority and concurrences shows, the
Terry Court took pains to set limits on what kinds of searches Terry
allows, leaving latter opinions to determine the intricacies of the
details regarding permissible and impermissible searches for
weapons.62 So there is no question that the officer may not use the
Terry stop to search for drugs or anything other than weapons. The
extension of the Terry search in Hiibel comes from new cloth, not
Terry.63
The limited scope of searches allowed on reasonable suspicion
under Terry clarifies the faults of the Hiibel. Even assuming that the
suspect in Hiibel poses a threat because of the police report, nothing
in the Terry allows the officer to perform a search to determine that
the suspect “is wanted for another offense.” Furthermore, while a
suspect with “a record of violence or mental disorder” might well
pose an additional threat to an officer, nothing in Terry allows for an
officer to make an inquiry into this issue on reasonable suspicion
unless the suspect volunteers an answer. Instead, what Terry allows
for is a search for weapons. Because the Hiibel search was for
59

Id., 2460.
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
61
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
62
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (“We need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and
search for weapons.”)
63
Drawing on case in which additional circumstances were present, one could argue
that Terry permits searches for more than weapons; however, the Supreme Court
cases that permit more intrusive searches all have added factors that increase the
law enforcement interest or meet the Court’s “special needs” doctrine. For
example, Illinois v. Cabealles, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) and U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675 (1985), concern searches of motor vehicles while U.S. v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) concern searches at boarder crossings and Florida
v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) a consensual search. See also supra note 44.
60
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something different than weapons, it cannot be claimed to follow the
precedent from Terry.

IV. Kolender Analysis
In Kolender, the Court held a statute requiring “credible and
reliable” identification unconstitutional because the law was
impermissably vague under the Due Process clause.64 While the
Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the statute
violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan’s concurrence did.
He stated that the Fourth Amendment prevents the police from
compelling identification for crime prevention when the crime is
unspecified.65 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Kolender,66
as affirmed in Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd.,67 contradicts the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the “commonsense” inquiry into identity
furthers the state interest in crime prevention that allows for Terry
stops.
In holding that the Nevada Gaming Control Board Agent acted
unreasonably in interpreting the same Nevada law at issue in Hiibel,68
the Ninth Circuit worried about a bootstrapping problem with
Nevada’s stop and identify statute.69 Because a suspect can be Terry
stopped for less than probable cause, an officer demanding
identification and not getting it under a stop and identify statute could
arrest a suspect on less than probable cause.70 Thus the situation in
which a suspect is arrested on less than probable cause exists simply
because a suspect does not sufficiently justify herself to the state: this
gives the government a power the Ninth Circuit decided transgressed
the constitutional foundations of the Fourth Amendment.71 To
reiterate the point, the state now has the power to arrest a person
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461 U.S. 352 (1983).
Id. at 362 (“Merely to facilitate the general law enforcement objectives of
investigating and preventing unspecified crimes, States may not authorize the arrest
and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification or
further information on demand by a police officer.”).
66
Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981).
67
Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002).
68
Id. at 882.
69
Id. at 880.
70
Id. (quoting Kolender, 658 F.2d at 1366-67).
71
Id. at 881.
65
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without meeting its obligation under the Fourth Amendment simply
because the person detained chooses to withhold her name.
Besides the bootstrapping problem, stop and identify statutes also
represent the problem of “mission creep.” If the officers initiating the
Terry stop are not satisfied with the suspect’s name, the Terry stop
will expand to satisfy the police. However, such an investigation is
prohibited by previous Court rulings. Even allowing that compelling
a name is permissible, follow-up questions to confirm the name would
be impermissible because the police do not have the authority to
compel answers to other questions.72 For example, the reasoning
behind the Supreme Court’s finding in Kolender that a California
law’s requirement for “credible and reliable” information “encourages
arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient
particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.”73
The same concerns apply for the Nevada stop and identify statute.
Suppose an officer detains a suspect under a legitimate Terry stop.
The officer asks for the suspect’s name. A skillful criminal will not
give the correct name because that might be incriminating, allowing
the officer to make an arrest for an outstanding warrant. A suspect
with an unusual name, a nickname, or a name similar to a person with
an outstanding arrest warrant might lead the officer to request more
than a simple name.74 The only assistance the stop and identify
statute offers police is for those suspects who give their real names
and there is information in a police database linking that person to
information that enables the officer to take the necessary precautions
for safety. The savvy criminal will simply give a false name to avoid
a trap.
Consider the situation in which the Court’s decision in Hiibel
leaves us. For the suspect with an unusual name, the officer might
now desire credible information to ensure that the suspect is not lying.
This puts the officer in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment
because now the unusual name has caused the officer to seek
credibility for the identification, a power that outstrips the officer’s
72

See supra notes 21-24 an accompanying text.
Kolender, 461 U.S at 361.
74
Consider the situation that arises when a passenger name matches a name on the
government’s “no fly” list. The individual must then prove that she is not the
person whose name appears on the government list. So a simple request for a name
can quickly become complicated. Leigh A. Kite, Note Red Flagging Civil Liberties
and Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System
Meet the Constitutional Challenge? 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385, 1421-22
(2004).
73
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authority under Kolendar. Alternately, for the suspect who lies, the
officer has no capacity to determine that the suspect is lying without
“credible and reliable” identification. Thus, without verifying the
identity offered by the suspect, the stop and identify statute is of
extremely limited use to law enforcement. So, in the name of crime
control, the next case under the Hiibel decision will concern the steps
officers can take to verify the identity offered unless the Court
withdraws the power granted in Hiibel.
Under Hiibel, the Court recognized a law enforcement interest in
ensuring a suspect is not “wanted for another offense, or has a record
of violence or mental disorder” to facilitate police safety. For police
to further the interests identified in Hiibel, the identity a suspect offers
must be credible. For the identity to be reliable, it must be backed up
by more than the suspect’s attestation that the name is correct. Thus
the officer, in advancing the law enforcement interests in Hiible, will
ask for proof of identification, bringing Hiibel into conflict with
Kolender. Considering how Hiibel made short work of Terry, we
have no assurance that the protections against requiring people to
produce “credible and reliable” identification from Kolender will
stand. Indeed, Kolender is on a collision course with Hiibel. Because
of the prospect that police will demand IDs and criminals lie, the
Court’s agenda that the request for a name “not become a legal
nullity”75 speaks in favor of allowing a requirement for “credible and
reliable” identification.
Thus the Ninth Circuit’s worry in Carey that stop and identify
statutes will allow suspects to be arrested on less than probable cause
is the natural result of the Court’s crime prevention and safety
interests upon which the Hiibel decision is predicated. If the suspect
has an unusual name, the suspect could be asked for credible
identification; failure to produce that identification could lead to an
arrest on less than probable cause. The “commonsense” need for
police to ensure that names are reliable is just a case away from
allowing the police to arrest suspects on less than probable cause for
failure to produce reliable identification. So the Court’s policy
interest in Hiibel, if followed, would allow the police to arrest on less
than probable cause for failure to possess the right kind of name or
produce the right kind of ID. In short, this renders Terry stops
identity checkpoints that can bootstrap an arrest on less than probable
cause.

75

Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
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V. Identity Checkpoints and the Constitution
Identity checkpoints are at odds with basic liberties in the United
States. Travel and freedom of movement are basic freedoms under
the Constitution,76 recognized in Chicago v. Morales77 and Terry as
falling under the First Amendment. An identity checkpoint inhibits
freedom of movement because citizens are required to disclose their
identity in circumstances in which they have not broken the law and
do not want their identity known. Requiring citizens to do so, even
under reasonable suspicion, results in a chilling effect on freedom of
movement, violating the privacy of those who wish to travel
anonymously, thus violating the right to travel.
Calling the request for a name predicated on reasonable suspicion
an identity checkpoint is not hyperbole. The term fits because the
kind of search allowed by Terry prior to Hiibel was predicated on the
officer’s safety. Hiibel extends beyond what falls under the officer’s
safety to purposes that give the police more power against suspects.
While it certainly is true that allowing identity checks predicated on
reasonable suspicion could facilitate law enforcement, law
enforcement cannot advance at the expense of a constitutional right.
A seminal example of this is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court
held that evidence obtained in custodial investigations when
defendant has not been advised of rights and privileges against selfincrimination is inadmissible.78 Citizens have a fundamental right to
go about their lives without having to justify themselves to
government. This is what a right to privacy affords—“the right to be
let alone.”79 Hiibel authorizes a police power to violate this right.
76

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in text of
the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is
firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643
(1969) (“[The right to travel] is a right broadly assertable against private
interference as well as government action. Like the right of association, NAACP v.
Alabama, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the
Constitution to us all.” (citations omitted)). Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
(1958) (“The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process under the Fifth Amendment.”). The Articles of
Confederation also provided for freedom of travel in Article IV: “and the people of
each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State.”
77
527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999).
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384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (J. Brandeis,
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When discussing the government intrusion into the lives of
citizens, Justice Kennedy says that a request for identity “is likely to
be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only
in unusual circumstances.”80 Here Justice Kennedy’s speculation on
what is significant is misplaced. While for some the disclosure of a
name is may be insignificant, for others the disclosure is the
beginning of significant consequences. For those for whom the
disclosure is significant, if the disclosure violates the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, then the Constitution
protects the individual to refrain from disclosing the information
unless the state offers immunity. Had Office Dove learned that the
alleged assault he was investigating involved two Hiibels—Dudley
and his daughter—Hiibel’s name would have served as evidence of a
relationship subject to Nevada’s domestic violence laws. In Nevada,
when there is probable cause to believe that domestic battery has
occurred, Nevada law requires arrest of the suspect unless mitigating
circumstances are present.81 Thus Hiibel’s situation was exactly the
situation Justice Kennedy erroneously thought he had deferred to the
next case: Hiibel’s fulfillment of Officer Dove’s demand for a name
would constitute a “disclosure that the witness reasonably believes
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
evidence that might so be used.”82
But even in the absence of incriminating circumstances the
compelled disclosure of a name violates the Constitution. The
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
80
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2461.
81
Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 171.137 (1) (Except as otherwise provided in subsection
2, whether or not a warrant has been issued, a peace officer shall, unless mitigating
circumstances exist, arrest a person when he has probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested has, within the preceding 24 hours, committed a battery upon
his spouse, former spouse, any other person to whom he is related by blood or
marriage, a person with whom he is or was actually residing, a person with whom
he has had or is having a dating relationship, a person with whom he has a child in
common, the minor child of any of those persons or his minor child.) See Brief for
Petitioner at 37, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124
S.Ct 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554) (discussing the relationship between Nevada’s
domestic violence law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.018) and self-incrimination).
82
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2454 (citation omitted.)
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fundamental right a legally sanctioned demand for a name predicated
on the threat of arrest implicates extends beyond the enumerated
rights specified in the Constitution. According to an enumerated
rights analysis, the only rights that the Constitution protects are those
rights specified in the text. Of course, contrary to Justice Scalia’s
protestations,83 the Supreme Court does not engage in strict
enumerated rights analysis, for ours is a constitution of reserved rights
and enumerated powers. Instead, another tradition of constitutional
interpretation claims there are rights related to those enumerated in
the Constitution, which exist because the exercise of the enumerated
rights cannot occur without the exercise of unenumerated rights; these
are embodied in general notions like liberty and substantive due
process. The locus classicus of privacy literature captures this more
fruitful way of understanding rights in the Constitution:
[I]n very early times, the law gave a remedy only for
physical interference with life and property, for
trespass vi et armis. Then the “right to life” served
only to protect the subject from battery in its various
forms; liberty meant freedom from actual constraint;
and the right to property secured the individual his
lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of
man’s spiritual nature, his feelings and his intellect.
Gradually the scope of these rights broadened; and
now the right to life has come to mean the right to
enjoy life,—the right to be let alone; the right to liberty
secures the exercise of extensive civil privileged; and
the term “property” has grown to comprise every form
of possession—intangible as well as tangible.84
The tradition of finding rights in the Constitution other than those
enumerate employed in previous decisions like Wolf v. Colorado85

83

Justice Scalia is a vocal and sophisticated proponent of this view. Consider his
comments in Lawrence v. Texas: “But there is no right to ‘liberty’ under the Due
Process Clause, though today’s opinion repeated makes that claim.” 539 U.S. 558,
591 (2003) (J. Scalia, dissenting.) A consequence of Scalia’s view is that a state
can, through the democratic process, outlaw anything not specifically stated in the
constitution. See also SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, ed. Amy Gutmann
(1998).
84
The Right to Privacy, supra note 79.
85
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society.”).
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and NAACP v. Alabama,86 reached maturity in Justice Douglas’s
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. There, Douglas said that “the
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
government intrusion.”87 Locating a right like privacy in the First
Amendment is predicated on the notion that privacy is required for the
First Amendment to be meaningful. Through the unfolding of
history, the Court found the First Amendment afforded more
protections than those captured in a simple reading of the text and
what the Framers thought the text meant. The Court has used this
method to ensure that the Constitution captures the conceptual import
of notions like freedom of association instead of limiting the terms to
an understanding to what the individual writers actually thought at the
time the Constitution was written.88 For example, even though some
drafters of the Constitution and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not hold opinions about Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine
of “separate but equal,” a full understanding of the Constitution
allowed Brown v. Board of Education to overturn this unfortunate
result.89
Without privacy, an individual’s ability to express unpopular
views, join controversial organization, or support unpopular causes is
inhibited. The consequences an unrestrained majority might visit
upon those expressing minority views leads those expressing the
unpopular views to do so privately. Without the protection privacy
affords, the majority can more easily chill free speech. Reading
privacy into the Constitution best captures how to understand the
implications of the concepts the Framers employed when writing the
Constitution.
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357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“This Court has recognized the vital relationship
between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”).
87
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
88
In the literature, this way of interpreting the constitution is ably defended by
Ronald Dworkin: “If we are trying to make best sense of the Framers speaking as
they did in the context in which they spoke, we should conclude that they intended
to lay down abstract not dated commands and prohibitions. The Framers were
careful statesmen who knew how to use the language they spoke. We cannot make
good sense of their behavior unless we assume that they meant to say what people
who use the words they used would normally mean to say--that they used abstract
language because they intended to state abstract principles. They are best
understood as making a constitution out of abstract moral principles, not coded
references to their own opinions (or those of their contemporaries) about the best
way to apply those principles.” The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (1997)
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Consider the Court’s opinion in NAACP v. Alabama, in which the
state of Alabama wanted to obtain the membership roles of the
NAACP. Relying on decisions in previous opinions such as Schware
v. Board of Examiners, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment also protects the right to freedom of association, even
though the First Amendment does not specifically mention
association.90 Taking the next step in NAACP v. Alabama, Justice
Harlan authored a unanimous opinion for the Court linking
association and privacy: “This Court has recognized the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s
associations. …Inviolability of privacy in group associations may in
many circumstances be indispensable to freedom of association,
particularly where a group espoused dissident beliefs.”91 By linking
the right to privacy with the First Amendment the Court raised the
level of scrutiny to which any state action abridging the right to
privacy is subject. Although Justice Douglas does refer to NAACP v.
Alabama in linking privacy to the First Amendment, the case does not
provide much guidance when the state has a legitimate purpose since
Alabama did not advance a legitimate state purpose for acquiring the
NAACP membership roles.
Drawing on the method used in NAACP v Alabama, Griswold v.
Connecticut found a Connecticut law banning the sale of
contraceptive devices unconstitutional. In his majority opinion,
Douglas mined past cases to show how rights implicit within those
enumerated in the Constitution have been recognized in past cases
and used to strike down state laws that abridge those rights. For
example, he referred to cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters92 and
Meyer v. Nebraska93 to show that the First Amendment protected the
right for parents to choose schools for their children and the right for
the study of the German language in private schools: These are all
rights not enumerated in the First Amendment yet they are recognized
by the Court as penumbral protections under the First Amendment.
While these rights derived from the conceptual and practical
implications of the enumerated right may be peripheral rights,
prohibiting peripheral right infringes on the enumerated right:
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Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
357 U.S. at 462.
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268 U.S. 510 (holding that parents have the right to send their children to private
schools instead of public schools).
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“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less
secure.”94
By referring to these past decisions, Douglas established that the
rights enumerated in the Constitution do not stand on there own;
rather, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance.”95 Of particular importance for Douglas’s opinion are
what he called the “zones of privacy” created by the First
Amendment.96 A zone of privacy covers an aspect of a citizen’s life,
protecting that domain from government inquiry unless the citizen
allows the disclosure.97 In Griswold, Douglas found a zone of privacy
for the marital relationship: “Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”98 Therefore the Court ruled
that the Connecticut law banning the sale of contraceptives intruded
upon this private relationship and was therefore unconstitutional.
The unifying idea for all of these recognitions of privacy is an
even more basic idea that the majority in Terry affirmed:
this Court has always recognized, “No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”99
The right to be left alone is the foundation unifying the zones of
privacy found in the Bill of Rights; individual rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights are particular manifestations of these rights. Its
persistence is undermined by the power not to let persons alone.
The Court has extended the privacy rights identified in Griswold
to the nondisclosure of information. This right began in NAACP v.
Alabama, allowing the NAACP to refuse to release its membership
94

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
Id. at 479.
96
Id. at 484 (“Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.”).
97
Likewise, in the Miranda decision, the Court recognized that custodial
interrogations require informing a prisoner of the right to remain silent even though
the Constitution provides no such requirement in the text. But the Fifth Amendment
protects against self-incrimination. See infra note 119.
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Id. at 485-86.
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392 U.S. at 8 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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roles.
After Griswold, Whalen v. Roe100 and United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom101
affirmed the existence of this right to nondisclosure. This is line of
jurisprudence under which Hiibel fails: There is a right to
nondisclosure for private matters. The state cannot inquire into an
individual’s private business under the threat of arrest without
probable cause. A name is private because it relates the identity of a
person to a private matter the person is undertaking, e.g., a political
gathering. Any effort to learn a citizen’s name through identity
checkpoints, absent probable cause, is a constitutional violation. But
this unconstitutional result is exactly what Hiibel allows. In the next
section, we provide a further exploration of the importance of a name
to an individual’s liberty as protected by the Constitution.

VI. What’s in a Name?
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy seems perplexed about
why Hiibel did not want to disclose his name to the police: “Even
today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name was
none of the officer’s business.”102 This analysis assumes that Hiibel,
perhaps as in the necessity to invoke the Fifth Amendment in court or
in Congress, has a positive duty to explain why he does not want to
disclose his name. There are many reasons someone might not want
to disclose a name, and it should not be incumbent upon a citizen to
provide a reason for failing to do so to the officer or the Court absent
probable cause. Instead, after recognizing the constitutional right
entitling the suspect not to have their privacy invaded, what the law
should do is set policy to err on the side of protecting the
constitutional right. Indeed, since our Constitution embodies this
general policy interest, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that laws
do not illegitimately infringe on that constitutional right. This is the
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429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting
"privacy" have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”). (footnote omitted.)
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process of judicial review has been the raison d’etre of the Court
since Marbury v. Madison.103
Recognizing the place of a policy interest preventing the
disclosure of a name under reasonable suspicion begins by realizing
the importance of anonymity in the founding of the United States.
The history of this country began with the founders using
pseudonyms for political purposes. For example, during “the first
twenty years of American constitutional government, six men who
would later be president wrote under pen names.”104 The Court has
stated that the “tradition [of anonymity in support of political causes]
is most famously embodied in the Federalist Papers, authored by
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but signed
‘Publius.’”105 The need for anonymity to separate the opinion from
the person expressing the view is known to the Court and anyone who
votes:
[There is] a respected tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes. This tradition is perhaps
best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won
right to vote one’s conscience without fear of
retaliation.106
The Court’s concern to allow people to separate their identity
from unpopular opinions has manifested itself in numerous opinions:
For example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers’ 74 Campaign
Comm., the Court said that the ‘‘Constitution protects
107
against the compelled disclosure of political associations.’’
The Court did so because ‘‘[s]uch disclosures ‘can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment’.”108 In NAACP v. Alabama the Court made the same
point.109 Likewise, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, the Court
held that the NAACP did not have to disclose membership
lists.110 In making its ruling, the Court noted that freedom of
103
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association and freedom of speech ‘‘are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more
subtle governmental interference.”111 Finally, in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, Justice Black’s concurring
opinion noted the fear that dominate groups will suppress
deviant views and his hope in the constitution to prevent
such injustices.112
In short, the Court has recognized that compelling the disclosure
of identity can chill the exercise of civil liberties.
We are not unmindful that the damage done by
disclosure to the associational interests of the minor
parties and their members and to supporters of
independents could be significant. These movements
are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus
are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In
some instances fears of reprisals may deter
contributions to the point where the movement cannot
survive. The public interest also suffers if that result
comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in
the free circulation of ideas both within and without
the political arena.”113
If those in power can link the speech they do not like with the
person who speaks then those with power can use their authority to
make life more difficult for the speaker: “The evidence offered need
show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a
party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.”114 The
Court has recognized this as a general policy concern behind the First
Amendment.115 As such, there is no need for the speaker in a
particular case to explain why he or she desires to keep his or her
identity secret; instead, the Court recognizes that people sometimes
do want to keep their persons secret, and allowing the government to
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Id. at 523.
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persecution of persons even faintly suspected of entertaining unpopular views, it
may be futile to suggest that the cause of internal security would be fostered, not
hurt, by faithful adherence to our constitutional guarantees of individual liberty.”).
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Brown, 459 U.S. at 93 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976)).
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Id. at (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
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Id.
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compel the speaker’s identity would chill citizens’ exercise of their
liberties.
There may be policy concerns that the state might advance by
requiring citizens to disclose their identities to police. For example,
requiring writers to disclose their identities would promote
responsible authorship. If authors had to sign their names to
everything they wrote, there would fewer false statements printed.116
Of course, such a policy decision has a cost, and the cost would be the
suppression of important political speech critical of those in power
anonymity facilitates. This is a cost that the Court has previously
understood the Constitution holds as more important than the social
good of fewer false publications.117
Laws that compel citizens to identify themselves on the basis of
reasonable suspicion fail under a similar analysis. To be sure,
compelling citizens to identify themselves would help law
enforcement. Stopping a suspect on reasonable suspicion and
eliciting the suspect’s identity could result in an arrest because of an
outstanding warrant. Likewise, learning that a suspect stopped on
reasonable suspicion has previously assaulted police officers would
allow officers to take additional steps to ensure their own safety,
another legitimate policy concern. While arresting those with
outstanding arrest warrants and informing police when additional
safety measures are worthy goals, such a goals cannot be pursued if
they illegitimately transgresses a civil liberty under the Constitution.
And this is precisely what laws compelling suspects to disclose their
identity do. Consider again the domestic violence example in which
merely providing a name is incriminating when the last name matches
the victim’s because it is evidence of a domestic relationship.118 And,
pace Justice Kennedy, this was exactly the case in Hiibel.119
116

This motivation was given by the City of Los Angeles in Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960). In that case, a city ordinance requiring the names and
addresses of those who prepare handbills printed upon the handbills. The Court
struck down the city ordinance, noting that anonymity serves a vital political
purpose in promoting Free Speech: “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.” Id. at 64.
117
Id.
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See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
119
Indeed, the question Justice Kennedy thought he could defer was manifest: “Still,
a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the
time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to
convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider
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Even ignoring the specific transgression of the Fifth Amendment
in this case, the Hiibel inverts the fundamental relationship between
the government and the governed under our Constitution. The error
in Justice Kennedy’s analysis of Hiibel’s complaint begins exactly
when he asks why Hiibel did not want to disclose his name. The
analysis recognizes that suspects have no duty to disclose their
identity regardless of the consequences.
The constitutional
protections afforded through free speech protections do not require
that anyone justify herself to the state unless the state has already
satisfied its burden of probable cause; namely, that the individual in
question is a threat to others and must be deprived of liberty.
Probable cause is the standard for satisfying this burden. Reasonable
suspicion has been carved out by Terry for allowing a lower standard
of proof for briefly detaining suspects for a limited search for
weapons for the officer’s safety and questions that the suspect need
not answer.120 Placing any duty on citizens to disclose their identities
hinders free speech.121 In asking the question about why Hiibel does
not want to disclose his name, Justice Kennedy gets the relationship
between citizens and the state exactly backwards. Hiibel does not
have to justify himself to the state and the state cannot take action
against him unless it has compelling justification. From silence alone
the state is not entitled to infer probable cause for an arrest.122
Of course, as Holmes’ cliché about not shouting fire in a crowded
theater when there is no fire indicates, free speech has limits.123
However, what this truism recognizes is a specific exception to the
whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what
remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.” Hiibel, 124 S.Ct.
at 2461.
120
See supra 7 – 10.
121
Of course, any positive duty to disclose identity would also violate their Fourth
Amendment right preventing unlawful search and seizure and Fifth Amendment
right against self incrimination. Like the right to free speech, these rights also cast
their shadows on privacy—the right to be left alone.
122
For a discussion of how the right to remain silent in the First and Fifth
Amendments combine with the Fourth Amendment prohibitions against
unreasonable searches to render law compelling the possession and presentation of
identification unconstitutional, see Sobel, supra note 25 at 372-73.
123
Justice Holmes asserted this in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Later, the Court modified Schenck in Brandenberg v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 444 (1969)
(stating that speech can only be barred when it was direct and likely to incite
imminent lawlessness). In Schenck, Holmes majority opinion compared distributing
flyers opposing the draft in World War I to shouting fire in a crowded theater.
Critics of Holmes’ opinion contended that the flyers were intended to keep people
out of the raging fire in Europe.
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general right. Specific exceptions to general rights are permissible in
light of a recognizable threat; people panic to cries of fire, so the law
tries to reduce a likely harm. In contrast, the Nevada law picks out no
specific threat. To justify the law, the Supreme Court imagines
hypothetical threats that would only exists in special conditions with
certain suspects, not conditions that exists with any crowded theater.
Restrictions on fundamental rights like free speech require specific
threats that trigger unthinking responses, and these are the restrictions
the law embodies.124 Under Hiibel, the police need not find any
specific threat to hinder free speech; instead, under Hiibel the chilling
effect is unchecked.
Laws like Nevada’s stop and identify statute that permit the state
to arrest citizens on the basis of reasonable suspicion for not
identifying themselves puts citizens in the position of having to
identify themselves to authorities when they would rather travel or
express themselves anonymously.
Recognizing the nature of
restraints the Court previously upheld for free speech permits an
understanding of the inherent criticisms leveled against laws that
allow police to arrest citizens who do not identify themselves:
As an impressionable lad growing up in the '40s in a
sleepy Wisconsin burg where the local cinema was the
principal source of amusement, I consumed a steady
diet of World War II movies, where I saw essentially
the same scene time and again: in some area under the
Nazi thumb, some hapless traveler would be stopped
by the authorities, at which point the man in charge
would inevitably say, "Ve vant to zee your papers."
The traveler would produce his credentials and then
would be subjected to a thorough grilling about where
he was going, where he had been, why he was about,
etc. Each time I watched such a scene, shivers went
down my spine, and it was then that I concluded that
one of the most striking differences between a free and
a totalitarian society was that in the former scenes like
124

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (Government regulation of speech must
address a real, not hypothetical, harm and must directly mitigate that harm.);
NAACP v. Clairtowne Hardware Co., Miss., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see also
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (explaining that “‘fighting
words’—‘those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace’ are not protected by the constitution.”). Even though
the ‘fighting words’ doctrine is regarded as dead, this is a more towards allowing speech
and does not affect the point, for the point is that restrictions on speech require a specific
threat.
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that could not happen. We certainly have come a long
way, unfortunately in the wrong direction!125
With this sentiment, Michigan law Professor LaFave laments the
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights to law enforcement. As we have
argued, the rights enumerated in the amendments are conceptually
related to each other and others based on the unenumerated rights like
the right to privacy. Furthermore, the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments and the conceptually related unenumerated rights
provide protections against identity checkpoints. Against the First
Amendment, identity checkpoints intrude on free speech for the sake
of an unspecified threat. Anyone traveling to an unpopular event,
perhaps an event that many members of the local community do not
support, would fear the consequences of linking identity with
unpopular views. The chilling effect that such laws have on First
Amendment rights runs counter to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
As such, we know why identity checkpoints send “shivers” down our
spines—they resonate with a regime that we have to justify ourselves
to, not a state that must justify itself to its citizens.126 Democratic
government derives from the consent of the governed, not the other
way around.
Thus Justice Kennedy’s demand that Hiibel do more than affirm
that his identification was not the police’s business is misguided. It is
not the place of the Court to engage in an exercise weighing the
amount of a fundamental right that can be restricted for the sake of a
hypothetical threat. Instead, the Court should have followed its
rational for other infringements on First and Fourth Amendment
rights by prohibiting restrictions absent a real, specified threat
actually related to the restriction.

VII. Conclusion: The Bright-line
Arguing that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments prohibit
laws that compel citizens to identify themselves on reasonable
125

Wayne R. LaFave, The ‘Routine Traffic Stop’ From Start to Finish: Too Much
‘Routine,’ Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1890-91
(2004).
126
For another take on this difference with reference to the Fifth Amendment, see
Privacy Activism, amicus brief for Hiibel, available at
http://www.abditum.com/hiibel/pdf/privacyactivism_amicus.pdf, (last visited Feb.
27, 2006) at 5-6.
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suspicion, the analysis here of the First Amendment parallels previous
approaches to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.127 For all of these
accounts, the proper remedy is a bright-line that prohibits the state to
compel a citizen to provide a name unless the person has been
identified as a specific threat to the state on the basis of probable
cause.
Justice Kennedy’s questionable assertion that a request for
identification is less intrusive than a frisk for weapons allowed the
Court to transgress a fundamental right persons possess under the
Constitution. However, the “commonsense” obtrusive nature of the
intrusion is not what is significant. Instead, what matters is that a
weapons frisk under reasonable suspicion is predicated on a threat to
the officer’s safety; officers undertaking a Terry weapons frisk cannot
use any information gained in those frisks to arrest citizens except for
contraband discovered through “plain-feel.”128 A bright-line existed
between what Terry said the officer could do for safety and any
additional inquiry: The officer could ask, but the suspect may remain
silent. Hiibel erases that bright-line, inverting the constitutional
relationship, by empowering the state to employ the force of law to
compel citizens to give information to the police, presenting citizens
with a state that can intrude further on their rights under the
Constitution.
The Court needs to reestablish the line that existed before Hiibel.
Taking away the ability of the state to compel citizens to identify
themselves will restore the rights courts should recognize under the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Restoring this line will allow
citizens to express their First Amendment rights to silence without
having to fear repercussions for not being able to comport themselves
anonymously. Moreover, maintaining the line will help ensure that
the proper balance between citizens and the state under the
Constitution; the government will have to justify itself to citizens
instead of improperly conscripting the citizens to incriminate
themselves under state powers.
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See, for example, Shelli Calland, Hiibel v. Sixth Judiciary District Court: Stop
and Identify Statues Do Not Violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 251 (2005) (arguing for the restoration of the bright-line rule
from Terry). Our analysis goes beyond Calland’s timely article by linking the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations with the First Amendment and the general
structure of the Bill of Rights.
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